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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
was to protect against liability in New York 52 where, ironically,
Section 167(3) is available to protect New York insurers. Quaere:
What would the courts of New York have done if the husband had
called the New Jersey insurance company to defend and pay any
judgment in the original New York action?
Conclusion
In its present state of effectiveness, it would be well to repeal
Section 167(3). The present ease with which the spouse taps the
proceeds of the policy at the expense of the insurer will not be rectified
until the statute is interpreted as an absolute bar to recovery on a
policy issued to the other spouse.
M
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NEW YORK LAW
OF PRIMA FACIE TORT
In 1923 the New York Court of Appeals" first 2 assented to
Lord Bowen's famous proposition 3 that the intentional infliction of
injury upon another without justification is prima facie actionable.
Since that time the prima facie tort doctrine has come increasingly
into use by injured parties in search of a remedy not afforded by
traditional tort actions. This increase in prima facie tort litigation
provides the occasion for the courts to define the doctrine more pre-
cisely and to limit its application within discernible boundaries. It is
the purpose of this article to analyze the recent developments in the
application of the prima facie tort doctrine in New York.
52But cf. Metzler v. Metzler, 8 N.J. Misc. 821, 151 Atl. 847 (1930), where
it was held that a wife could not sue her husband in New Jersey on a judgment
obtained in New York.
1 Beardsley v. Kilmer, 236 N.Y. 80, 140 N.E. 203 (1923).
2 Dicta in an earlier New York case had expressed disapproval of the
prima facie tort doctrine. See Foster v. Retail Clerks' Protective Ass'n, 39
Misc. 48, 53-56, 78 N.Y. Supp. 860, 864-66 (Sup. Ct. 1902). However, in 1920
the Appellate Division held a complaint sufficient as an "action on the case"
where it alleged injury resulting from words not in themselves defamatory.
Husted v. Husted Co., 193 App. Div. 493, 184 N.Y. Supp. 844 (2d Dep't 1920).
See text at note 7 infra.
3 "Now, intentionally to do that which is calculated in the ordinary course
of events to damage, and which does, in fact, damage another in that other
person's property or trade, is actionable if done without just cause or excuse.
Such intentional action when done without just cause or excuse is what the
law calls a malicious wrong. . . ." Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow
& Co., [1889] 23 Q.B.D. 598, 613, aff'd, [1892] A.C. 25.
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The latest pronouncement of the Court of Appeals in the prima
facie tort area was made in Brandt v. Winchell,4 the culmination of a
persistent litigation 5 that has helped shape the law of prima facie tort.
The court in this case clearly indicates that the question of what con-
duct will constitute a prima facie tort is basically a policy decision
made by the court.
Essentially the allegations of the complaint were that the defen-
dant, Winchell, with the deliberate intention of wreaking harm upon
the plaintiff, embarked on a plan designed to destroy a fund-raising
corporation, the Cancer Welfare Fund, organized by the plaintiff,
and to make it impossible for him ever again to participate in such
activity. In furtherance of this scheme, Winchell allegedly (1) insti-
gated harassing investigations of the plaintiff and the latter's corpo-
ration by the State Attorney General that ended in a consent in-
junction restraining plaintiff from ever engaging in the business of
soliciting charitable contributions; (2) fomented a baseless criminal
prosecution that ultimately ended in acquittal; (3) prevailed upon
the police department to cancel plaintiff's pistol permit and license
as a private detective; and (4) published false accusations against
the plaintiff that damaged his professional and business reputation.
Special damages alleged included loss of salary and the revocation
of his detective license. Punitive damages were also requested.
The court dismissed the fourth allegation as sounding in dafama-
tion while not pleading the defamatory statements in haec verba. In
dismissing the other allegations, the court held' that (1) the damages
alleged resulted from official governmental action and were not a re-
sult of defendant's acts and (2) the defendant's conduct in prodding
the official agencies into action could not properly be made the subject
of a prima facie tort complaint, even if done for the sole purpose of
injuring the plaintiff.
The language of the court is significant:
The law is now settled in this State that, "Even a lawful act done solely out
of malice and illwill to injure another may be actionable." . . . This is not to
say that the present state of the law is that an act not otherwise tortious will,
without exception, become actionable when it is done with the blameworthy
purpose of injuring another and such other is in fact injured. There are
situations where for one of several reasons a court is constrained to ignore
the wrongful motive of the actor .... Accordingly, it may fairly be said that
whenever the gist of an alleged cause of action (as here) is that an otherwise
lawful act has become unlawful because the actor's motives were malevolent,
the court is called upon to analyze and weigh the conflicting interests of the
parties and of the public in order to determine which shall prevail.0
43 N.Y.2d 628, 148 N.E.2d 160 (1958).
5 See Brandt v. Winchell, 286 App. Div. 249, 141 N.Y.S.2d 674 (1st Dep't
1955) (per curiam), dismissing without leave to replead the amended complaint
of Brandt v. WVinchell, 283 App. Div. 338, 127 N.Y.S2d 865 (1st Dep't 1954).
r Brandt v. Winchell, supra note 4, at 634-35, 148 N.E.2d at 163-64.
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The court then stated that public policy in effect insulated de-
fendant from answering in damages to plaintiff because official action
is deemed presumptively valid and may not be collaterally attacked
through the use of the prima facie tort doctrine. This interposition
of public policy considerations squarely presents the question of what
conduct is actionable as a prima facie tort.
Since the prima facie tort action is in effect an action on the
case 7 designed to supplement and not to supplant traditional tort
categories,8 New York has taken the position that prima facie tort
may not be predicated on facts that fit into a recognized common-law
action.9 Thus, a prima facie tort complaint would not lie where the
specific acts alleged constituted defamation, 10 interference with con-
tract relations," disparagement of property,1 2 or abuse of corporate
office. 13  But it has also been maintained that otherwise lawful acts
can be converted into a prima facie tort when motivated solely by an
intent to injure.14 The Appellate Division synthesized these views in
the statement: "The key to the prima facie tort is the infliction of
temporal harm resulting in damage, without excuse or justification by
an act or series of acts which would otherwise be lawful." 15 This
indication that only otherwise lawful acts can be made tortious by
motive is subject to the inherent ambiguity of the terms "lawful-
unlawful." The more precise meaning is probably that only an act
not otherwise a tort upon the plaintiff can support a prima facie tort
action in view of the decision in Shisgall v. Fairchild Publications,
Inc.16 There it was held that the intentional breach of contract by
7 See Knapp Engraving Co. v. Keystone Photo Engraving Corp., 1 A.D.2d
170, 172, 148 N.Y.S.2d 635, 637 (1st Dep't 1956) ; Brandt v. Winchell, 283
App. Div. 338, 342, 127 N.Y.S.2d 865, 868 (1st Dep't 1954).
8 See Ruza v. Ruza, 286 App. Div. 767, 146 N.Y.S.2d 808 (1st Dep't 1955).
9 See Knapp Engraving Co. v. Keystone Photo Engraving Corp., note 7
supra; Ruza v. Ruza, note 8 supra; Brandt v. Winchell, note 7 supra.10 Kaplan v. K. Ginsburg, Inc., 7 M.2d 136, 160 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (Sup. Ct.
1957); Green v. Time, Inc., 147 N.Y.S.2d 828 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mere., 1 A.D.2d
665, 146 N.Y.S.2d 812 (1st Dep't 1955), aff'd mern., 3 N.Y.2d 732, 143 N.E.2d
517 (1957); Dubourcq v. Brouwer, 124 N.Y.S.2d 61 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd inem..
282 App. Div. 861, 124 N.Y.S.2d 842 (1st Dep't 1953). But see LoBianco v.
Scott Publications, Inc., 82 N.Y.S.2d 248 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
11 Paramount Pad Co. v. Baumrind, 3 A.D.2d 655, 158 N.Y.S.2d 687 (1st
Dep't 1957) (per curiam) ; Best Window Co. v. Better Business Bureau, Inc.,
148 N.Y.S.2d 652 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 1 A.D.2d 1002, 151
N.Y.S.2d 833 (1st Dep't 1956).
12 Mennella v. Garroway, 138 N.Y.L.J. No. 88, p. 6, col. 7 (Sup. Ct. Nov. 1,
1957).
13 See Abrams v. Allen, 297 N.Y. 52, 74 N.E.2d 305 (1947).
'4Al Raschid v. News Syndicate Co., 265 N.Y. 1, 191 N.E. 713 (1934);
Beardsley v. Kilmer, 236 N.Y. 80, 140 N.E. 203 (1923); J.J. Theatres, Inc.
v. V.R.O.K. Co., 96 N.Y.S.2d 271 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Avallone v. Bernardi, 83
N.Y.S.2d 905 (Mount Vernon City Ct. 1948), aff'd 7nen., 276 App. Div. 1094,
96 N.Y.S.2d 685 (2d Dep't 1950).
1sRuza v. Ruza, 286 App. Div. 767, 769, 146 N.Y.S.2d 808, 811 (1st Dep't
1955) (emphasis added).
16207 Misc. 224, 137 N.Y.S.2d 312 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
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one contracting party for the sole purpose of inflicting damage on the
other contracting party states a cause of action in prima facie tort.
Within this broad concept that acts not otherwise a tort upon the
plaintiff can be made so when motivated solely by a desire to injure,
the Court of Appeals has now apparently created the exception that
the malicious instigation of official action will not give rise to prima
facie tort liability. This result is analogous to the results reached
in lower court cases that held malicious use of a statutory remedy
to enforce a judgment 17 or the bringing of a suit for declaratory
judgment 18 could not be the basis of a prima facie tort.19 Where
official action is involved, however, there seems to be a distinction be-
tween merely instigating official action and producing the conditions
without which official action could not have been taken.20  Thus, a
prima facie tort complaint was sufficient where it alleged plaintiff-
employee had been subjected to prosecution for tax evasion because
defendant-employer had filed fraudulent statements of plaintiff's earn-
ings with state and federal agencies.21  Similarly, a complaint would
lie where plaintiff was deported on the basis of false information fur-
nished immigration officials by defendant. 22
Beyond the area of official action there are few guideposts to
indicate what policy considerations will impel the courts to decide
that specific conduct is sufficiently prima facie tortious to require
defendant to justify it or be held liable. Perhaps to avoid meeting
this question head on, stringent requirements of pleading, damages,
and intent have been formulated relevant to prima facie tort actions.
In form, the pleadings must be confined to allegations of fact
and special damage, with any statement of wrongdoing and injury
appropriate to a traditional tort pleaded as a separate cause of action.23
If the complaint concerns written or oral statements made by the
defendant, at least a summary of the statements must be pleaded.
24
17 Bono Sawdust Supply Co. v. Hahn & Golin, 3 A.D.2d 221, 159 N.Y.S.2d
725 (2d Dep't 1957).
18 Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Unger, 4 M.2d 955, 158 N.Y.S.2d 892 (Sup.
Ct. 1956).
19 But see Schauder v. Weiss, 88 N.Y.S.2d 317 (Sup. Ct. 1949), aff'd inern.,
276 App. Div. 967, 94 N.Y.S.2d 748 (2d Dep't 1950), where a complaint was
sufficient as a prima facie tort where it alleged that defendants maliciously
conspired to institute fraudulent divorce proceedings against plaintiff wife.
Compare Rager v. McCloskey, 305 N.Y. 75, 111 N.E.2d 214 (1953), zwith
Schauder v. Weiss, supra. See also J.J. Theatres, Inc. v. V.R.O.K. Co., 96
N.Y.S.2d 271 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
20 This distinction was put forth in the argument in Brandt v. Winchell but
was not considered by the Court of Appeals because it was not properly sup-
ported by the allegations of the complaint.
21 Gale v. Ryan, 263 App. Div. 76, 31 N.Y.S.2d 732 (1st Dep't 1941).
22 Al Raschid v. News Syndicate Co., 265 N.Y. 1, 191 N.E. 713 (1934).
23 Brandt v. Winchell, 283 App. Div. 338, 127 N.Y.S.2d 865 (1st Dep't
1954); Sheppard v. Coopers' Inc., 156 N.Y.S.2d 391 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd nern.,
2 A.D.2d 881, 157 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1st Dep't 1956).
24 See Al Raschid v. News Syndicate Co., note 22 supra. The purpose of
the rule apparently is to enable the court to determine if the gist of the action
19581
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Strict enforcement is given these rules to insure that poor pleadings
in traditional torts cannot be hidden behind a prima facie tort
smokescreen.
25
Damage is a necessary element of the prima facie tort action 28
and the severe circumscription of the type of damage recoverable is
another effective method of limiting the scope of the doctrine.
Although some few cases have allowed damages of another kind
27
the rule now generally adopted in New York demands that the injury
must be to plaintiff in his trade or business. 28 Damage to reputation
is not sufficient.2 9  Damages claimed must be specially pleaded,
30
although not necessarily with mathematical precision,3 ' and must have
been proximately caused by defendant's acts.32  So exacting are the
pleading requirements that a complaint must name employers and
customers who have left plaintiff's business by virtue of defendant's
conduct.
3 3
The specificity of these damage requirements would seem to cur-
tail severely, if not eliminate altogether, the possibility of collecting
consequential damages s 4 There is some doubt as to whether puni-
tive damages may be awarded. The presence of actual malice nor-
is defamation. See also the pleadings reported in Brandt v. Winchell, 3 N.Y.2d
628, 148 N.F.2d 160 (1958).
25 See Ruza v. Ruza, 286 App. Div. 767, 146 N.Y.S.2d 808 (1st Dep't 1955);
Kaplan v. K. Ginsburg, Inc., 160 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
26 Rager v. McCloskey, 305 N.Y. 75, 111 N.E.2d 214 (1953); Brandt v.
Winchell, 286 App. Div. 249, 141 N.Y.S.2d 674 (Ist Dep't 1955) (per curiam),
dismissing the amended complaint of Brandt v. Winchell, 283 App. Div. 338,
127 N.Y.S.2d 865 (1st Dep't 1954).
27 See Al Raschid v. News Syndicate Co., 265 N.Y. 1, 191 N.E. 713 (1934)
(plaintiff deported because of defendant's false statements) ; Schauder v. Weiss,
88 N.Y.S.2d 317 (Sup. Ct. 1949), aff'd nern., 276 App. Div. 967, 94 N.Y.S.2d
748 (2d Dep't 1950) (personal discomfort resulting from fraudulent divorce
proceedings). A reading of Gale v. Ryan, 263 App. Div. 76, 31 N.Y.S.2d 732
(1st Dep't 1941), would indicate that the case belongs in this category. How-
ever, Test v. Eldot, 135 N.Y.L.J. p. 7, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. Feb. 29, 1956), points
out that the complaint in Gale v. Ryan contains averments of injury to employ-
ment and business.
28 When Brandt v. Winchell came before the Appellate Division for the first
time, the court stated that injury actionable in prima facie tort is "ordinarily"
in the trade or busipess area. See Brandt v. Winchell, 283 App. Div. 338, 342,
127 N.Y.S.2d 865, 868 (1st Dep't 1954). But in dismissing the amended com-
plaint the court categorically stated that the damage recoverable ". . . consists
of injury due to loss in plaintiff's occupation or business." Brandt v. Winchell,
286 App. Div. 249, 250, 141 N.Y.S.2d 674, 675 (1st Dep't 1955) (per curiam).
29 Rager v. McCloskey, note 26 mipra.
30 Brandt v. Winchell, note 28 supra.
31 See Federal Waste Paper Corp. v. Garment Center Capitol, Inc., 185
Misc. 818, 824-25, 57 N.Y.S.2d 200, 206 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
32 Brandt v. Winchell, 3 N.Y.2d 628, 148 N.E.2d 160 (1958).
33 Faulk v. Aware, Inc., 155 N.Y.S.2d 726, 732 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
34 Cf. J.J. Theatres, Inc. v. V.R.O.K. Co., 96 N.Y.S.2d 271 (Sup. Ct. 1950)
(time spent away from business because of defendant's harassing lawsuits not
sufficient injury for prima facie tort).
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mally makes exemplary damages recoverable 3 and in at least one
case the court did not find the pleading of exemplary damages in-
appropriate to the prima facie tort action.3 6 However, statements
that the action is concerned only with "temporal" 37 or "actual" 38
damages and that special damages alone are recoverable 39 may show
a trend to exclude exemplary damages from the prima facie tort
recovery. While there is no public policy against granting exemplary
damages,40 the apparent desire of the courts to restrict the efficacy
of the prima facie tort doctrine may result in the disallowance of
such redress. Underlying these strict rules is the policy consideration:
To permit a recovery in prima facie tort upon an allegation and proof of
general damage would throw open to regulation of morals and ethics all con-
duct which, when substandard, results in injured feelings without other and
special damage. It is the allegation of temporal damage which makes such an
action maintainable upon a proper statement of a cause in prima facie tort....41
The intent upon which a prima facie tort complaint can be predi-
cated in New York differs from that necessary in most other juris-
dictions 42 and from that required in traditional tort actions where
the intent to do the act productive of the injury is all that is required. 43
For prima facie tort liability in New York, the intent of the actor
must have been solely to injure the plaintiff.44  This intent, called
malice, need not incorporate actual ill-will 45 or spite directed against
the person injured, but merely the infliction of wrongful harm upon
him without just cause or excuse.46  Nor does malice in this sense
mean merely that the injury is foreseen as an inevitable consequence
of the act,47 for the harm must not only be foreseen but also provide
35 See McCoRMICK, DAMAGES § 79 (1935).
36 See Shisgall v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 207 Misc. 224, 236, 137
N.Y.S.2d 312, 323 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
37 See Brandt v. Winchell, 3 N.Y.2d 628, 148 N.E.2d 160 (1958).
38 See Brandt v. Winchell, 286 App. Div. 249, 251, 141 N.Y.S.2d 674, 676-
(1st Dep't 1955) (per curiam).
39 See Sheppard v. Coopers' Inc., 156 N.Y.S.2d 391, 395-96 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd
inem., 2 A.D.2d 881, 157 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1st Dep't 1956).
40 See Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 112, 120 N.E. 198, 202
(1918).
41 Test v. Eldot, 135 N.Y.L.J. p. 7, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. Feb. 29, 1956).
42 See Forkosch, An Analysis of the "Prima Facie Tort" Cause of Action,
42 CORNELL L.Q. 465, 474-79 (1957) ; Note, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine,
52 CoLum. L. REv. 503, 507 (1952).
43 See PROSSER, TORTs § 8 (2d ed. 1955); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 13, com-
ments d, e (1938).
44 Beardsley v. Kilmer, 236 N.Y. 80, 140 N.E. 203 (1923); Ruza v. Ruza.
286 App. Div. 767, 146 N.Y.S.2d 808 (1st Dep't 1955).
45 A complaint will be sufficient if the facts alleged warrant an inference that
the defendant intends harm to the plaintiff. Advance Music Corp. v. American
Tobacco Co., 296 N.Y. 79, 70 N.E.2d 401 (1946).
4 See Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., note 45 supra;
American Guild of Musical Artists, Inc. v. Petrillo, 286 N.Y. 226, 36 N.E.2d
123 (1941).
47 See Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194 (1904).
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the motivating force for the commission of the act.48  Thus, if it can
be foreseen that an act will wreak harm upon another while at the
same time benefiting the actor and the harm is not desired, but merely
permitted, there will be no liability. 49 The benefit to the actor will
be deemed to justify the harm to the plaintiff, and justification is the
complete defense to a prima facie tort. The premise is that self-
interest negates malice even when the means used to promote that
self-interest are of questionable morality or ethical validity.5"
The concept of justification must therefore be viewed as the
neutralizing factor that will override the intent to injure. What con-
stitutes justification is again a policy consideration, i.e., the justifica-
tion pleaded must be something of which the courts will take notice. 51
Normally a showing that defendant's conduct was motivated, at least
in part, by some economic reason will provide justification 52 if the
economic benefit to be attained is not too remote from the means used
to achieve it.53 It has been said that social justification is also pos-
sible, 54 but a defendant raising such a defense runs the risk that the
court will find that he is attempting to act as the conscience of
society.55
The interplay of justification and intent has resulted in some
cases where liability was apparently predicated on the basis of fore-
seeability of injury rather than the presence of actual intent to injure.
Courts have granted an injunction where a labor union deprived a
minority of seniority rights to favor the majority; 56 allowed a re-
covery against a defendant subcontractor whose fraudulent overcharg-
ing of the prime contractor caused the latter to breach a contract with
48 Ruza v. Ruza, 286 App. Div. 767, 146 N.Y.S.2d 808 (1st Dep't 1955).
49 Benton v. Kennedy-Van Saun Mfg. & Eng. Co., 2 A.D.2d 27, 152 N.Y.S.2d
955 (1st Dep't 1956).
50 Id. at 29, 152 N.Y.S.2d at 958.5 1 Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 296 N.Y. 79, 70 N.E.2d
401 (1946) ; Beardsley v. Kilmer, 236 N.Y. 80, 140 N.E. 203 (1923). See also
Opera on Tour, Inc. v. Weber, 285 N.Y. 348, 34 N.E.2d 349, cert. denied, 314
U.S. 615 (1941); Exchange Bakery & Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin, 245 N.Y.
260, 157 N.E. 130 (1927).
52 See Benton v. Kennedy-Van Saun Mfg. & Eng. Co., note 49 supra;
Barile v. Fisher, 197 Misc. 493, 94 N.Y.S.2d 346 (Sup. Ct. 1949). See also
Holmes, Privilege; Malice, and Intent, 8 HARv. L. REv. 1, 3 (1894). The
privilege to inflict harm upon another ". . . rests on the economic postulate that
free competition is worth more to society than it costs." Ibid.
53 Thus, the conduct of labor unions has frequently been held unjustified
when it was found to be directed toward an improper union objective. See,
e.g., Opera on Tour, Inc. v. Weber, 285 N.Y. 348, 34 N.E.2d 349, cert. denied,
314 U.S. 615 (1941).
54 See Beardsley v. Kilmer, note 51 supra.
55 See Wilson v. Hacker, 200 Misc. 124, 101 N.Y.S.2d 461 (Sup. Ct. 1950);
cf., Unity Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 101 N.Y.S.2d 1000
(Sup. Ct. 1950).
56 Bucko v. Murray, 170 Misc. 902, 11 N.Y.S.2d 402 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd inem.,
258 App. Div. 867, 16 N.Y.S.2d 537 (1st Dep't 1939), aff'd nem., 283 N.Y.
634, 28 N.E.2d 35 (1940).
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the plaintiff; 5 7 allowed recovery against a vendee and a broker who
conspired to deprive plaintiff-broker of his commission on the sale
of a house; 58 and sustained a complaint in a tax fraud case.59  In
none of these cases does it appear that defendant's sole intent was to
injure the plaintiff. It will be observed however that in the union
case the minority that was stripped of seniority rights had previously
refused to strike with the union and the presence of an actual intent
to injure could have been inferred. In the other cases, the defendants
all had practiced a fraud upon a third party. It is submitted, there-
fore, that what is seemingly based solely upon an intent to commit
an act resulting in foreseeable harm actually rests upon an inferred
intent to injure derived from a failure of justification. In effect, de-
fendants were precluded from establishing their intent to commit a
fraud upon a third party by way of defense and therefore the only
inference possible from the facts alleged was that the injury resulting
to the plaintiffs was solely intended. This would be in accord with
Justice Holmes' statement that the question of privilege, i.e., justifi-
cation, would not arise at all unless the defendant were assumed to
have had notice of the probable consequences of his act. 60
The most important recent case in the area of the intent-
justification conflict is Reinforce, Inc. v. Birney,61 a case that casts
doubt as to whether the defendant bears the burden of coming for-
ward to show justification or if the plaintiff must prove that defen-
dant was motivated solely by malice. Before this decision the cases
had presumed that if the facts pleaded were such as to warrant an
inference of malice the burden was on the defendant to affirmatively
show a justification for his action.6 2  In Reinforce, Inc. v. Birney,
however, the Court of Appeals states that if the record shows an
... absence of proof that the motivation was entirely malicious,
plaintiff has no remedy of law." 63 Taken literally, this view would
mean the end of the prima facie tort doctrine in New York for it
would be a rare case indeed where a plaintiff could prove such single-
minded intent conclusively. Few actions could survive a motion to
dismiss at the end of plaintiff's case and defendant would be relieved
of the burden of coming forward with a justification. The Reinforce
case in this respect is against the traditional interpretation of the
prima facie tort doctrine, and, in view of the consequences such a
rule would have, it seems unlikely that it will be followed.
7 Bloomer v. Thermal Fuel Corp., 88 N.Y.S.2d 361 (Sup. Ct. 1949).58 Avallone v. Bernardi, 83 N.Y.S.2d 905 (Mount Vernon City Ct. 1948),
aff'd mere., 276 App. Div. 1094, 96 N.Y.S.2d 685 (2d Dep't 1950).5 9 Gale v. Ryan, 263 App. Div. 76, 31 N.Y.S.2d 732 (1st Dep't 1941).6 0 Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REv. 1, 6 (1894).
61 308 N.Y. 164, 124 N.E.2d 104 (1954).
62 See, e.g., Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 296 N.Y. 79,
70 N.E.2d 401 (1946) ; Beardsley v. Kilmer, 236 N.Y. 80, 140 N.E. 203 (1923);
Wilson v. Hacker, 200 Misc. 124, 101 N.Y.S.2d 461 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
63308 N.Y. 164, 170, 124 N.E.2d 104, 107 (1954).
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The strict standards thus far described serve more as an aid to
the defense and the court when examining a prima facie tort com-
plaint than as a guide to a plaintiff in determining if conduct can be
actionable as such a tort. In this respect Best Window Co. v. Better
Business Bureau 14 deserves careful attention. It represents an at-
tempt by the court to illuminate one of the most difficult problems in
the prima facie tort area-the vague line that separates the prima
facie tort from the tort of interference with contract relations.0 7'
In that case the court held that a prima facie tort is basically a
lawful act converted into a tort by the presence of the intent to injure.66
But the tort of interference with contract relations is in itself a
wrongful act, i.e., the unprivileged invasion of another's property right
in the contract, committed intentionally and knowingly. 7 The court
adopts the Restatement 6 view that the intent here need only be to
effect the purpose of severing the contract relations of the plaintiff 69
and not, as in prima facie tort, solely to injure him. For interference
with contract relations to lie there must be an express contract for a
term.70  W\Vhere there is only a contract terminable at will, however,
and the termination is brought about by means not unlawful in them-
selves, the action will be for discontinuance of business relations,
71
because, in essence, a prima facie tort depends upon a showing that
64 148 N.Y.S.2d 652 (Sup. Ct. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 1 A.D.2d 1002,
151 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1st Dep't 1956) (reversed for deficiencies in pleading).65 The lack of clear distinction between the two torts probably arises out
of the fact that in Lumley v. Gye, 2 E. & B. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B.
1853), the first case in which liability was imposed for interference with an-
other's contract, the court supported its decision by reasoning similar to that
which expresses the prima facie tort doctrine.
Many cases by way of dicta have cited with approval the statement in
Note, 52 COLUm. L. REv. 503, 508 (1952), that prima facie tort cases normally
comprehend some form of interference with contractual relations. See, e.g..
Brandt v. Winchell, 283 App. Div. 338, 342, 127 N.Y.S.2d 865, 868 (Ist Dep't
1954). The Best Window Co. decision, however, seems to be the first instance
where a court has attempted to evaluate the statement. The distinction the
case makes seems well founded if it is taken to mean that liability for inter-
ference with contract relations is imposed for intentional interference with
another's property; and in prima facie tort as a recognition that there is no
policy in the law that allows a person to intentionally inflict harm upon another
for no reason but to injure hi',.
66 Accord, Ruza v. Ruza, 286 App. Div. 767, 146 N.Y.S.2d 808 (1st Dep't
1955). See also Shisgall v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 207 Misc. 224, 137
N.Y.S.2d 312 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
67 Accord, Campbell v. Gates, 236 N.Y. 457, 125 N.E. 817 (1923) ; Lamb v.
Cheney & Son, 227 N.Y. 418, 147 N.E. 914 (1920).
68 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 766 (1939).
691 HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS 492 (1956) ; PROSSER, TORTS § 106, at 735
(2d ed. 1955).
- S. C. Posner Co. v. Jackson, 223 N.Y. 325, 119 N.E. 573 (1918); Terry
v. Dairymen's League Co-operative Ass'n, 2 A.D.2d 494, 157 N.Y.S.2d 71 (3d
Dep't 1956).
,1 Terry v. Dairymen's League Co-operative Ass'n, note 70 supra.
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the defendant acted solely out of malice. 72 The same policy consid-
erations that call for special damages in the prima facie tort area will
probably dictate that actual, special damages also be pleaded in this
action. Moreover, since the contract is terminable at will, the scope
of the defendant's privilege is greater and therefore, justification will
easily be found for his conduct. 73
A related problem arises, however, where there is no express
contract for a term but there is either a contract terminable at will
or a reasonable expectancy of business advantage to the plaintiff de-
riving from his relation to another. An action for interference with
these advantageous relations will lie if unlawful means-fraud, intimi-
dation, or breach of fiduciary duty-are used to deprive the plaintiff
of the benefits of that advantage. 74 Absent the use of unlawful means,
no action would lie for the deprivation unless it were motivated solely
by an intention to injure the plaintiff. There, prima facie tort would
be the proper action.
To illustrate, assume A, the exclusive manufacturer of certain
machinery, contracts to supply B with such machinery, who in turn
contracts to supply C, a retailer, with the machinery. D induces A
to break his contract with B. 75 D is liable to B for interference with
contract relations. If fraud, intimidation, or if possibly a fiduciary
position was used to effect the breach and thereby deprive C of pros-
pective advantage, D is liable to C for int6rference with advantageous
relations. If lawful means were used, then there is no liability to C
unless the action were taken with the sole intent by D to injure C.
But if D himself were a retailer, used lawful means, and was moti-
vated at least in part by the spirit of competition, no action would lie
by C against D for the economic end would justify his action as it
affects C. In all these instances, D would be liable to B.
Conclusion
The interpretation placed by the New York courts on the prima
facie tort doctrine indicates that it has been strictly confined and will
probably be of little utility in the future. The ten-year statute of
limitations that presumably attaches to prima facie tort 7 6 has led to
many attempts to avoid the shorter statute of limitations that apply
to other torts. However, such attempts have met with little success.
77
.2 Terry v. Dairymen's League Co-operative Ass'n, note 70 supra.
73 Terry v. Dairymen's League Co-operative Ass'n, note 70 supra; PROSSER,
TORTS § 107 (2d ed. 1955).
-4 Duane Jones, Inc. v. Burke, 306 N.Y. 172, 117 N.E.2d 237 (1954) ; Silva
v. Bonafide Mills, Inc., 82 N.Y.S.2d 155 (Sup. Ct. 1948); General Out Door
Advertising Co. v. Hamilton, 154 Misc. 871, 278 N.Y. Supp. 226 (Sup. Ct.
1935).
75 See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 870, comment b, illus. 1 (1939).
"6 See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. AcT § 53.
, See, e.g., Ruza v. Ruza, 286 App. Div. 767, 146 N.Y.S.2d 808 (lst Dep't
1958]
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As the scope of the actions for interference with contract relations
and prospective advantage increase, the corresponding scope for the
use of the prima facie tort doctrine will probably be constantly
diminished. Each case that deals with the doctrine seems to carve
out some new area of privileged conduct or add a stricter interpreta-
tion of the elements of the prima facie tort. It would seem that the
courts, in their zeal to insure that the doctrine would not get out of
hand, have reduced it to relative impotency. If the doctrine of the
Reinforce case is strictly followed, it is probable that the prima facie
tort will be merely of historical significance.
A
THE ELLIS CASE-SOME ASPECTS OF ADOPTION IN THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS
Introduction
Within the past year the Ellis adoption case has received nation-
wide publicity. After the Supreme Court of Massachusetts denied a
petition by Mr. and Mrs. Melvin Ellis for adoption' of Hildy McCoy
and rendered a custody decree in favor of the natural mother,2 the
petitioners removed the child from the jurisdiction and effected an
adoption in Florida.3 The case highlights certain aspects of adoption
in the conflict of laws. This note will deal with two jurisdictional
factors involved in the case. First, was the Florida court bound to
accord full faith and credit to the Massachusetts decrees? Second,
did the Florida court have the necessary jurisdiction to decree an
adoption ?
Facts of the Ellis Case
Pursuant to an agreement with Marjorie McCoy, upon the birth
of her illegitimate child Hildy McCoy, the Ellises took the girl from
the hospital with a view toward adopting her.
1955); Green v. Time, Inc., 147 N.Y.S.2d 828 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mere., 1 A.D.2d
665, 146 N.Y.S.2d 812 (1st Dep't 1955), aff'd mern., 3 N.Y.2d 732, 143 N.E.2d
517 (1957); Dubourcq v. Brouwer, 124 N.Y.S.2d 61 (Sup. Ct. 1953), aff'd,
282 App. Div. 861, 124 N.Y.S.2d 842 (1st Dep't 1953); Lucci v. Engel, 73
N.Y.S.2d 78 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
1 Ellis v. McCoy, 332 Mass. 254, 124 N.E.2d 266 (1955).
2 See Ellis v. Doherty, 334 Mass. 456, 136 N.E.2d 203 (1956).
3 In re Adoption of Hildy McCoy, Chancery No. 199852, N. Fla., July 10,
1957.
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